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A short comparison
By Cynthia Ford
I began this series with “A Short History of the Montana
Rules of Evidence.” In that article, I reviewed the rule-making
process which led to the 1976 adoption of the M.R.E. and the
fact that the M.R.E. are largely based on the Federal Rules of
Evidence (F.R.E.), which became effective two years earlier.
However, in several important respects, the Montana Evidence
Commission felt that the existing Montana jurisprudence on a
particular issue made more sense than the federal counterpart,
and chose to depart from the federal model. The Montana
Commission Comments to each rule state whether that rule was
drafted to mirror, or deviate from, the corresponding federal
rule.
Only one of the M.R.E. (Rule 407) has been modified in any
significant way since they were adopted. By contrast, the F.R.E.
have been amended multiple times, and just recently (2011)
were systematically “restylized.” Thus, even if the particular
M.R.E. originally reflected the federal version, subsequent federal amendments may have caused a diversion if those amendments were substantive. I recently prepared a short comparison
of the current F.R.E. and the M.R.E. for my upcoming Evidence
class at UMLS, and thought it might be helpful to practicing
lawyers as well. This comparison is meant to cover major differences, and does not include those which I think are minor or
inconsequential.

MAJOR DIFFERENCES2 FROM F.R.E.
Judicial Notice, Article II: Montana more detailed
M.R.E. 201 explicitly covers judicial notice of “all facts,”
whereas F.R.E. 201 is much messier, governing judicial notice
“of an adjudicative fact only, not a legislative fact” without providing any definition of either term.
The F.R.E. Article II on Judicial Notice has only one rule,

Rule 201. By contrast, Montana adds M.R.E. 202, “Judicial
notice of law.” It requires a trial court to take judicial notice of
the laws (common law, constitutions and statutes) of the United
States, of Montana, and of every other state, territory and jurisdiction of the United States. Additionally, Rule 202 lists many
other types of law which a court may judicially notice of its own
accord or on request of a party.
Presumptions, Article III: Montana more detailed
F.R.E. 301 is very short and vague, and does not even define
“presumption.” Montana’s version is quite a bit longer, defining presumptions in general and then differentiating between
conclusive (M.R.E. 301(b)(1) and disputable presumptions
(M.R.E. 301(b)(2). The Montana version also details the effect
of presumptions, the burden of evidence necessary to overcome
a disputable presumption, and how a judge should cope with
inconsistent presumptions.

RELEVANCY, ARTICLE IV
Rule 404(a) Character Evidence
Under F.R.E. 404(a)(2), a federal criminal defendant may
choose to offer evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the
victim. However, the federal price for doing so is that the prosecutor is now free to do two things: rebut that evidence about
the victim AND adduce evidence of the same trait of character
of the defendant. Under M.R.E. 404(a)(2), the state criminal
defendant may offer evidence of a pertinent trait of character of
the accused, but the prosecutor may only rebut that evidence.
The Montana prosecutor is not thereby freed to put on evidence
about the defendant’s character.
In both state and federal court, in certain types of cases even
if the defendant does not attempt to prove anything about the
victim’s character but does put on evidence to show that the
victim was the first aggressor in the incident, the prosecutor can
offer evidence about the victim’s character trait of peacefulness.
The difference is that in federal court, this can occur only in
homicide cases. In Montana state court, the prosecutor may use
RULES, next page

1 Copyright Cynthia Ford.
2 Of course, this outline is for initial research only, and I specifically disclaim any warranties as to its accuracy and thoroughness. Furthermore, it does not include any amendments made to either set of rules—Montana and federal—after June 2013.
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this tool in both homicide and assault cases “where the victim is
incapable of testifying.”
Rule 406 Habit Evidence: Montana more specific
In both state and federal courts, the general rule is that character evidence is not admissible, but habit evidence is admissible as proof of conduct on a particular occasion. However,
the F.R.E. do not contain any definition of either “character”
or “habit” in the rules, although there is some guidance in the
CAN. The Montana version of Rule 406 does define “habit” and
furthermore specifies two methods of proving habit, opinion or
specific instances of conduct “sufficient in number to warrant a
finding that the habit existed…”
Rule 408 Settlement Offers and Conduct:
Federal more specific
In both sets of rules, the general concept is the same, and
is based on the public policy in favor of settlement of cases.
Both prohibit evidence of settlement offers and of conduct and
statements made during settlement negotiations. However,
Montana’s ban applies only when the evidence is intended to
prove liability for or the invalidity of the claim. An amendment
to FRE 408 now additionally prohibits use of such evidence for
impeachment purposes. Montana has not yet followed suit.

RULE 409 MEDICAL EXPENSES
The exact titles of this rule differ, and that difference indicates the substantive difference in the Montana and federal
rules. FRE 409 is “Offers to Pay Medical and Similar Expenses,”
and prohibits evidence of either offers to pay or actual payment
of medical, hospital or similar expenses as evidence of liability.
MRE 409 is “Payment of Expenses.” By its terms, evidence that
payment of “expenses occasioned by an injury or occurrence”
(so not necessarily limited to medical-type expenses) was actually made is banned, but there is no prohibition about evidence
that an offer to do so was made.

origin of semen, pregnancy, or disease that is at issue
in the prosecution.
Federal Rules 413-415: Similar Crimes Admissible in
Civil and Criminal Sexual Assault and Child Molestation
Cases—no Montana counterpart
The FRE have three specific rules by which Congress meant
to ensure that the jury would hear evidence that the person
accused (civilly or criminally) of sexual assault or child molestation had performed other similar acts, whether or not those earlier acts had resulted in charging or conviction. There has been
much academic criticism of those rules. Montana, like many
other states, has never adopted any of them. Thus, in sexual assault and child molestation cases in Montana state courts, MRE
403 and 404 will govern the admissibility of prior acts by the
defendant.

PRIVILEGES, ARTICLE V: HUGE DIFFERENCES
In Montana, privileges are statutory only. M.R.E. 501 states
that there is no privilege of a witness about any matter unless
the constitution, statute or court rule provides such a privilege.
Numerous Montana Supreme Court cases discuss the public
policy in favor of full disclosure of information helpful to a jury,
and the resulting narrow construction of even those privileges
which are provided by statute. (The Montana privilege statutes
are located in M.C.A. Title 26, Chapter 1, Part 8).
By contrast, FRE 501 rejects a statutory list of privileged
communications approach. Instead, it provides that federal
evidentiary privileges are to be decided by the federal courts on a
case-by-case basis: “The common law—as interpreted by United
States courts in the light of reason and experience — governs a
claim of privilege unless any of the following provides otherwise:
• the United States Constitution;
• a federal statute; or
• rules prescribed by the Supreme Court.”

N.B.: F.R.E. 501 specifically provides that in federal diversity
of citizenship cases, state privilege law governs for those claims on
which state law provides the rule of decision.
SEX OFFENSE CASES: FRE CONTAIN SEVERAL
In addition to this striking difference in approach, Montana
SPECIFIC RULES WHICH ARE NOT IN THE MRE and the federal system do not recognize the same privileges as
a substantive matter. Montana statutes provide privileges for
communications between: spouses (criminal only); attorney-cliFederal Rule 412: “Rape Shield”—no MRE 412
FRE 412 applies to all federal civil and criminal cases involv- ent; parishioner-clergy; speech pathologist/audiologist-patient;
psychologist-patient; student-educational employee; domestic
ing alleged sexual misconduct, and as a general rule prohibits
evidence of the victim’s sexual behavior or sexual predisposition. violence/sexual assault advocate-victim. There also are privilegThere are several exceptions outlined in Rule 412. Montana has es for confidential communications made to a public employee,
and for communications made in the course of mediation. For
a similar provision (for criminal cases only), but it is statutory
civil medical malpractice actions only, any apology or expresrather than a rule of evidence:
sion of sympathy is privileged. Montana has a specific “Media
M.C.A. § 45-5-511: Provisions generally
Confidentiality Act” which statutorily provides a privilege to
applicable to sexual crimes
protect media sources. M.C.A. 26-1-901 to 903. Montana also
privileges law enforcement officials from disclosing the identity
(2) Evidence concerning the sexual conduct of
of informants.
the victim is inadmissible in prosecutions under
Without doing an in-depth review of the federal case law, as
this part except evidence of the victim’s past sexual
a
general
proposition, federal courts recognize: both testimonial
conduct with the offender or evidence of specific
instances of the victim’s sexual activity to show the
RULES, next page
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and communications privileges for spouses in criminal actions;
attorney-client privilege; parishioner-clergy privilege; and a
psychotherapist-patient privilege (which covers licensed clinical social workers as well as psychologists). There is no doctorpatient privilege. The Supreme Court has not decided any cases
about speech pathologist/audiologist privilege, student-teacher
privilege, advocate-victim privilege, public employee privilege,
mediation privilege or apology privilege. Federal protection of
the reporter-source communication has been declined.
The M.R.E. has specific rules, 503 and 504, dealing with the
waiver of privilege, if the holder voluntarily discloses any significant part of the privileged matter, unless that disclosure was
erroneously compelled. M.R.E. 505 prohibits court and counsel
from commenting on any claim of privilege.
The F.R.E. contains only one other privilege rule after 501.
F.R.E. 502, relatively recently adopted, deals with the effect
of disclosures of information which is protected by either the
attorney-client privilege or the “work product” doctrine. This
rule is specific and complex. Ironically, Montana does not have
a counterpart, so that disclosures of this sort are dealt with by
Montana case law rather than rule or statute.

WITNESSES, ARTICLE VI
Rule 606—Competency of Juror as Witness—one
difference
The general rule in both the federal and state versions of Rule
606 is that it is very hard to introduce a juror’s testimony about
what happened in the jury in order to attack the validity of the
verdict. The federal and Montana versions of Rule 606 both except (and thus allow) juror testimony about extraneous information improperly brought to the attention of the jury, and about
outside influences brought to bear on any juror. FRE 606(b)(3)
also allows juror testimony that a mistake was made in entering the verdict on the form (for instance, that they agreed on
$100,000.00 but the foreperson wrote $10,000.00). MRE 606(b)
(3) instead allows juror testimony about whether there was any
resort to the determination of chance (such as rolling a dice or a
coin toss).
Rule 609—Impeachment by Conviction of Crime—huge
difference
F.R.E. 609 allows the opponent of a witness to present evidence that the witness has previously been convicted of a crime.
The overall concept is that criminality impacts credibility. The
federal rule is specific and complex about what type of crime, and
how long ago the conviction, in deciding whether the evidence is
admissible.
The Montana approach is exactly the opposite, plain and
sweet: “For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness,
evidence that the witness has been convicted of a crime is not
admissible.”

OPINIONS AND EXPERT TESTIMONY,
ARTICLE VII
Rule 702 Testimony by experts—very different
FRE 702 was amended to codify the reliability requirements
Page 20

for expert testimony imposed by the U.S. Supreme Court in the
Daubert and Kumho Tire cases, which rejected the pre-Rules
“Frye general acceptance test.” MRE 702 has not followed suit,
and does not contain in the language of the rule anything about
reliability of the expert’s method or application of that method in
the case at hand.
Furthermore, the Montana Supreme Court cases do not
mirror those of the federal court system. Like the U.S. Supreme
Court, the Montana Supreme Court has rejected the pre-Rules
“general acceptance” test in favor of a more liberal admissibility.
However, Montana does not apply Daubert and its progeny to
all forms of expert testimony. Montana does use a Daubert-like
analyses when the expert testimony involves “novel scientific
evidence:”
Expert testimony regarding novel scientific
evidence must be reliable. Hulse, ¶ 52 (citing Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 589, 113 S.Ct.
2786, 2795, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993)). We have adopted
non-exclusive factors to consider when determining
whether novel scientific evidence is reliable, including
testing, peer review, technique rate of error, standards
of operation and general acceptance.
Wheaton v. Bradford, 2013 MT 121, 370 Mont. 93,
300 P.3d 1162, 1166, footnote 3.
However, when the testimony does not involve a “novel”
scientific method, Montana does not require a Daubert analysis.
“[A]ll scientific expert testimony is not subject to the Daubert
standard and the Daubert test should only be used to determine
the admissibility of novel scientific evidence.” Hulse v. State,
Dep’t of Justice, Motor Vehicle Div., 1998 MT 108, 289 Mont. 1,
28, 961 P.2d 75, 91.
Certainly, if a court is presented with an issue
concerning the admissibility of novel scientific
evidence, … the court must apply the guidelines set
forth in Daubert, while adhering to the principle set
forth in Barmeyer. However, if a court is presented
with an issue concerning the admissibility of scientific
evidence in general, the court must employ a
conventional analysis under Rule 702, M.R.Evid.
Hulse v. State, Dep’t of Justice, Motor Vehicle Div., 1998 MT
108, 289 Mont. 1, 31, 961 P.2d 75, 93.
[T]he district court’s gatekeeper role in applying
the Daubert factors, which guide trial courts in their
assessment of the reliability of proffered scientific
expert testimony, applies only to the admission of
novel scientific evidence in Montana. Damon, ¶ 18.
Novelty in Montana is assessed from a very narrow
perspective.
Harris v. Hanson, 2009 MT 13, 349 Mont. 29, 37,
201 P.3d 151, 158.
Rule 703—Basis of Expert Opinion—looks but is not
different in effect
Both the state and federal rules 703 allow an expert to base her
opinion upon inadmissible evidence, so long as that evidence is
RULES, next page
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of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in her field. The
federal version has been amended to add that the otherwiseinadmissible information is usually not allowed into evidence on
direct examination of the expert. The Montana version does not
contain this stricture, but the Montana Supreme Court has held
similarly: “Rule 703, M.R.Evid., anticipates that experts form
opinions and inferences based upon first-hand observations,
facts presented at trial and information obtained outside of
the courtroom prior to trial. The rule recognizes that an expert
witness may rely upon inadmissible evidence when forming
an opinion. … However, Rule 703, M.R.Evid., does not give a
witness permission to repeat inadmissible out-of-court statements to bolster his or her expert opinions before the jury.
(Citations omitted; emphasis added). Perdue v. Gagnon Farms,
Inc., 314 Mont. 303, 313, 65 P.3d 570, 576 (2003).
FRE 706—Court-Appointed Experts: Montana does not
have any such rule
In the federal system, Rule 706 allows a court to appoint its
own expert, and sets out the procedure for doing so. Montana
does not have any such rule.

requisite pretrial notice is provided to the opponent. (Note
that the same language used to be found in M.R.E. 803(8), the
public records exception, but was removed after the Montana
Supreme Court found that it unconstitutionally violated defendants’ Confrontation rights under the 6th Amendment. So far,
there has not been a similar holding re: 803(6), but recent U.S.
Supreme Court Confrontation Clause cases put this language in
jeopardy.)
Rule 803(8): Public Records Exception
The two versions of this rule are very different in their length
and complexity. The federal rule was greatly simplified and
shortened in the recent stylistic amendments to the FRE. The
Montana version still suffers from the stylistic difficulties of
the first draft, after which it was modeled. In addition, it seems
to exempt from the exception (thus prohibiting as hearsay) a
greater list than the revised federal rule, but more case law is
necessary to show whether this is really true.
MRE 803(24) and MRE 804(b)(5): Other exceptions to the
hearsay rule (the “residual exception”).

The FRE no longer contain these subsections to the rules
providing exceptions to the hearsay prohibition. Instead, the
“residual exception” has been consolidated, and expanded, into
FRE 807. Montana does not have a rule 807.
HEARSAY, ARTICLE VIII
FRE 807 imposes several requirements for an out-of-court
statement to be excepted from Rule 802 which do not apRule 801(d)(1)(A): Nonhearsay by definition: Prior
pear in either of the separate MRE residual exception clauses.
Inconsistent Statement of Witness
Montana’s only requirement is that the proffered hearsay bears
Montana’s version of this rule treats all prior statements
“equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness” as the
which are inconsistent with the witness’ testimony at trial as
enumerated exceptions. The federal rule has additional procenonhearsay, regardless of when, how, or to whom the statements dural (pretrial notice) and substantive requirements (that the
were made. Thus, a bartender could recount what the witness
evidence is more probative than other admissible evidence, and
said to him late on a Friday night. The federal version is much
that the interests of justice will be served by its admission) which
more conservative. In order for a prior inconsistent statement
make the residual exception more difficult to meet.
to qualify as nonhearsay, it must have been made in a specific
way (under penalty of perjury) and in a specific setting (at a trial, Rule 804(a):
deposition, hearing or “other proceeding”).
Difference 1: Montana is more liberal about when a witness is “unavailable,” thus potentially allowing more use of
Rule 803(3): Exception for Then-Existing Condition
the Rule 804 exceptions.
Montana does not extend this exception to statements of
The Montana version of Rule 804 (a)(1) says that “unavailmemory or belief which are offered to prove the fact rememability,” the prerequisite to use of the 804(b) exceptions, “inbered or believed. Thus, such statements of memory or belief
cludes” the 5 listed specific situations, thus potentially allowing a
are subject to the hearsay rule. FRE 803(3) does extend the
proponent to expand on that list. The federal version appears to
exception to statements of memory or belief, but only if the
be limited to the five listed situations.
statement relates to the terms or validity of the declarant’s will.
Difference 2: FRE 804(a)(5) requires the proponent to have
tried
to obtain testimony OR attendance by the declarant if
Rule 803(6): “Business Records” Exception
the statement is offered as a statement under belief of imThere are two differences here. First, the FRE version allows minent death, a statement against interest, or a statement of
a proponent of a business record to satisfy this exception’s foun- personal/family history. Montana simply requires the attempt
dation either by calling a foundation witness (the custodian of
to have been to obtain the declarant’s attendance at trial.
the record or “other qualified witness”) or by submitting a cerRule 804(b)(2) Statements under Belief of Imminent
tification which conforms to the self-authentication provisions
in FRE 902(11) or (12). Montana requires a foundation witness; Death: FRE version is more restrictive
the MRE do not have any corollary to 902(11) or (12).
Montana allows the use of this exception in all types of cases.
The second difference is that Montana’s version of 803(6)
The FRE version restricts it to homicide and civil cases, excludadds language not present in the federal rule. That language
ing other types of criminal cases.
purports to allow admission of Montana state crime lab reports
without calling the person(s) who compiled the report, if the
RULES, page 23
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Rule 804(b)(3): Statements against Interest:
Montana is more liberal
The FRE version recognizes statements which are against
only certain types of interests: proprietary, pecuniary or civil or
criminal consequences. The MRE version also includes statements which would “make the declarant an object of hatred,
ridicule or disgrace.”
Rule 804(b)(6): No such Montana exception
The FRE allow an exception to the hearsay prohibition for
statements which are offered against a party that wrongfully
obtained the declarant’s unavailability. This is an added penalty
for wrongfully causing a potential witness to be unavailable: the
wrongdoer both loses his/her/its own ability to profit from the
absence by invoking a hearsay exception, and may be harmed by
admission against that party of what would otherwise be barred
as hearsay.

to investigate and object.

BEST EVIDENCE, ARTICLE X
The two articles are basically the same. Montana’s version is
slightly more liberal, in allowing admission of not just a duplicate
but also “a copy of an entry in the regular course of business” in
lieu of an original in most circumstances.
Rule 1003: Admissibility of Duplicates: Montana adds
“[and] copies of certain entries.”
This is where Montana says that if you can admit either duplicates or copies of entries in the regular course of business” in lieu
of an original, unless there is some question about the authenticity of the original or other circumstances make this unfair. The
federal rule sticks to “duplicates,” which are defined as “accurately reproducing the original.”
Rule 1008: Functions of court and jury: FRE gives the jury a
role in some circumstances; MRE makes the judge the sole
decision-maker.

AUTHENTICATION, ARTICLE IX

The FRE recognizes, as does the MRE, that the judge ordinarily decides whether the proponent has fulfilled the factual
The federal version contains two rules which Montana does
conditions for admission of “other evidence” (not the original) of
not have, which make a substantial difference in how a propothe contents of a writing, recording, or photograph. However,
nent obtains admission of certain documents. The federal meththe FRE specifically assigns to the jury factual decisions about:
od dispenses with the need for live testimony from the custodian,
whether the asserted item ever existed; whether another one
if the record in question has been certified by its custodian.
produced is the original; and whether the “other evidence” accurately reflects the content. MRE 1008 says the court is to decide
FRE 902(11): Certified domestic business records: no
Montana counterpart.
all these issues.
FRE 902(12): Certified foreign business records: no
Montana counterpart.
Together, these two rules allow a proponent of a business
record in federal court to meet the authentication requirement
by submitting a document certified by its custodian, instead of
having to present live testimony from that custodian that the
document is indeed a business record. If it is a document from a
U.S. organization, the certification must meet federal standards.
If the document is from another country, the certification should
match the standards of that country. For both rules, the proponent must provide advance notice so that the opponent has time
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held on a regular basis at schools or community agencies.
• Lead a Youth Homelessness Task Force in your community.
NAEHCY can help you launch this inter-agency collaborative
to support homeless youth.
• Engage in state policy advocacy to support homeless youth.
NAEHCY’s State Advocacy Toolkit provides ready-to-use
advocacy tools and sample laws.

How can you find out about opportunities
to help?
To find out where your services are needed in your community, contact the following:
www.montanabar.org

ADDITIONAL RESOURCE
With the help of my fabulous research assistant, Michelle
Vanisko (3L, would be a terrific hire for next year, just saying), I
put together a side-by-side table of the M.R.E. v. F.R.E. It is too
long to print here, but I have posted it on my faculty page under
“Helpful Research Links”: http://www.umt.edu/law/faculty/people/ford.php. Again, this is current only through June 2013 but
you are welcome to download, print and use it with that caveat.
Cynthia Ford is a professor at the University of Montana School of Law
where she teaches Civil Procedure, Evidence, Family Law, and Remedies.

• Montana Legal Services Association, www.mtlsa.org. Anyone
who is being unlawfully denied access to education may apply
with MLSA by calling the HelpLine at 1-800-666-6899. Any
attorney who accepts a pro bono client in this area of law may
contact MLSA attorney Amy Hall at ahall@mtlsa.org if additional support would be helpful.
• Heather Denny, Montana’s State Coordinator for the
Education of Homeless Children and Youth, at 406-444-2036
or at hdenny@mt.gov. Ms. Denny can also provide contact
information for local school district McKinney-Vento liaisons.
• Montana Coalition for the Homeless, www.mtcoh.org
• Tumbleweed in Billings, www.tumbleweedprogram.org
• Patricia Julianelle, Legal Director of the National Association
for the Education of Homeless Children and Youth, at
pjulianelle@naehcy.org
Page 23

